![]() ![]() NET or bytecode from the JVM, and could work for a lot of cases of native platforms such as x86. This means it is a very efficient algorithm that scales linearly in the number of instructions to be processed, and it is usually enough for most simple instruction sets such as CIL from. Furthermore, this also allows for disassemblers to implement this interface, and decode instructions on-the-fly while simultanuously building the control flow graph. The reason why a separate interface IStaticInstructionProvider is used over a normal IEnumerable, is because a normal list might not always be the most efficient data structure to obtain instructions at very specific offsets. By repeatedly using the provided IStaticInstructionProvider and the IStaticSuccessorResolver instances, it collects every instruction and determines the outgoing edges of each basic block. 46–61.A static control flow graph builder performs a recursive traversal over all instructions, starting at a provided entrypoint, and adds for every branching opcode an edge in the control flow graph. Application to calculate the overall transfer function given its signal flow graph which can be drawn easily using a friendly graphical user interface. Zdancewic, S., Myers, A.C.: Secure Information Flow and CPS. ![]() Volpano, D., Smith, G., Irvine, C.: A Sound Type System for Secure Flow Analysi. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS) 25(5), 578–630 (2003) Spoto, F., Jensen, T.: Class Analyses as Abstract Interpretations of Trace Semantics. Spoto, F.: The Julia Generic Static Analyser (2004), Skalka, C., Smith, S.: Static Enforcement of Security with Types. Sabelfeld, A., Sands, D.: A PER Model of Secure Information Flow in Sequential Programs. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 21(1), 5–19 (2003) Sabelfeld, A., Myers, A.: Language-based Information-Flow Security. In: 26th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, San Antonio, Texas, pp. Practical Mostly-Static Information Flow Control. 12th NIST-NCSC National Computer Security Conference, pp. Mizuno, M.: A Least Fixed Point Approach to Inter-Procedural Information Flow Control. Lindholm, T., Yellin, F.: The Java TM Virtual Machine Specification. Lind-Nielsen, J.: BuDDy - A Binary Decision Diagram Package, Available at Laud, P.: Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow. In: 3rd Asian Workshop on Programming Languages and Systems (2002) Kobayashi, N., Shirane, K.: Type-based Information Flow Analysis for Low-Level Languages. Genaim, S., Spoto, F.: Information flow analysis for java bytecode. Genaim, S., Giacobazzi, R., Mastroeni, I.: Modeling Secure Information Flow with Boolean Functions. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)ĭenning, D.E.: A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow. Computer Languages 28(1), 3–28 (2002)ĭean, J., Grove, D., Chambers, C.: Optimization of Object-Oriented Programs Using Static Class Hierarchy Analysis. IEEE Transactions on Computers 35(8), 677–691 (1986)Ĭlark, D., Hankin, C., Hunt, S.: Information Flow for ALGOL-like Languages. Manuscript (2004)īryant, R.E.: Graph-Based Algorithms for Boolean Function Manipulation. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)īonelli, E., Compagnoni, A., Medel, R.: SIFTAL: A Typed Assembly Language for Secure Information Flow Analysis. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)īarthe, G., Rezk, T.: Secure Information Flow for a Sequential Java Virtual Machine (unpublished)īodei, C., Degano, P., Nielson, F., Riis Nielson, H.: Static Analysis for Secrecy and non-Interference in Networks of Processes. Jan 17, 2010, 3efb28461a8b, - first sketch for Bytecode CFG builder. Journal of Functional Programming, Special issue on Language-based Security (to appear)īarthe, G., Basu, A., Rezk, T.: Security Types Preserving Compilation. leclech.patrick, Jan 31, 2010, 1c3c84868e51, - start of new ControlFlow structure. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)īanerjee, A., Naumann, D.A.: Stack-based Access Control and Secure Information Flow. Addison Wesley Publishing Company, Reading (1986)Īmtoft, T., Banerjee, A.: Information Flow Analysis in Logical Form. Aho, A.V., Sethi, R., Ullman, J.D.: Compilers, Principles Techniques and Tools. ![]()
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